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Priority No. 15 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellants G. Richard 
Kasteler and Mary L. Daines, (hereinafter "Appellants"), by and through their undersigned 
counsel of record John Martinez, hereby submit the following Reply Brief:1 
l
. Appellants hereby limit their responses to "new matter" in Appellees* Brief as 
required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c). All other matter in Appellees' Brief 
has been addressed in Appellants' Opening Brief, and Appellants will provide such 
additional briefing as necessary with leave of the Court pursuant to such Rule. 
ii 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Surety arrangements in the Middle Ages involved hostage taking, or "body pledge," 
whereby the creditor kept the surety in irons. If the debtor did not pay the debt, the creditor 
was free to take his vengeance upon the person of the surety—whether through mutilation, 
enslavement or death. Suzanne Wilhelm, Taking Suretyship Seriously, 18 Okla. City U. L. 
Rev. 87, 87-88 (Spring 1993). 
Appellees seek to bring back the "body pledge" by arguing that the provision of a 
possession bond by a surety to allow a tenant to remain on the premises pending the 
adjudication of a landlord's eviction action exposes the surety-and the surety's home-to 
immediate execution in the eviction proceeding. (Br. of Appellees at 8)("[The landlord] 
could have immediately foreclosed on Kasteler's and Daines' houses at that point to satisfy 
part of [the landlord's] judgment against [the tenant, but] instead elected to spare Kasteler 
and Daines that unpleasant experience and sought to satisfy the judgment through other 
means.") Utah landlord-tenant law, however, has progressed beyond the Medieval. A 
landlord is required to bring an independent enforcement action to enforce a possession bond 
against a surety. In that separate action, the surety can defend itself by demonstrating that the 
tenant has paid the debt, that the surety has personally satisfied the debt thereby relieving the 
surety's home of the obligation, or raise any other defenses to enforcement of the bond. The 
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surety also can seek affirmative relief against the landlord or the tenant in such proceeding. 
The differences between the two procedures are substantial: First, tenants would have 
a hard time finding sureties if such sureties would be subject to immediate execution in the 
Unlawful Detainer proceeding. It is one thing to post a bond; it quite another to submit to 
jurisdiction and execution as a party to a cause. Second, the purpose of the possession bond 
is to allow the tenant to remain on the premises pending the adjudication of the landlord's 
unlawful detainer action. The renter's possession bond is a Legislatively-created device to 
balance out landlord-tenant relations, as a counterweight against the landlord's awesome 
power to bring a summary eviction proceeding. If the landlord ultimately loses the eviction 
suit, or if the landlord wins and the tenant proceeds to pay any resulting debt, the surety will 
not be affected in any way whatsoever. Appellees' reconstruction of possession-bond surety 
law, however, as indeed occurred in this case, would immediately allow the landlord to cloud 
title to sureties' homes, an additional landlord power which the legislature has withheld. 
That is the balance under current law, and the Legislature has not changed it. This 
Court should not either. 
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POINT I 
A TENANTS POSSESSION BOND FILED IN AN UNLAWFUL 
DETAINER ACTION IS NOT ENFORCEABLE IN THE UNLAWFUL 
DETAINER PROCEEDING 
Utah common law provides that a creditor on a bond cannot recover against a surety 
on the bond, nor against the surety's property, without bringing an independent action against 
the surety. Junction Irrigation Co. v. Snow, 101 Utah 71, 118 P.2d 130 (1941)(injunction 
bond); see also Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 
Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984)(citing Junction case as general rule); Fillmore City 
v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977)(confirming that Junction case states rule in Utah). 
Appellees do not dispute that this is the common law rule in Utah. Appellees also do not 
contest that when the Legislature has deemed it desirable to change that rule, it has done so 
expressly, and that the Legislature has not done so with respect to landlord-tenant possession 
bonds. 
Instead, Appellees argue that the requirement of an independent enforcement action 
is "wasteful." (Br. of Appellees at 16-17) However, making it cheap and easy for a landlord 
to remove a tenant and to foreclose on the homes of the tenant's sureties is not the sole—nor 
perhaps even the primary-purpose of landlord-tenant law. The Legislature has instead 
crafted a careful balance of all the interests involved. (See Opening Br. of Appellants at 26) 
The Legislature apparently does not view current law as "wasteful," since it has not changed 
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the requirement of an independent action in the landlord-tenant setting. 
Appellees further argue that the Unlawful Detainer statute, together with the terms of 
the possession bond herein, authorize enforcement of the bond in the Unlawful Detainer 
proceeding, without the need for an independent enforcement action. (Br. of Appellees at 17-
18) In the case of a private surety without compensation, as in the present litigation, the 
overwhelming general rule is that the bond is construed "strictly in favor of the surety." 
Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile. GMC Inc. v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 560-61 (Utah 
1983)(Durham, J., quoting M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 
463-64, 211 P. 998, 1009-10(1922). As further emphasized by the court in Dennis Dillon, 
where a bond is given pursuant to a statutoiy provision, the terms of the statute are read in 
conjunction with the provisions of the bond to determine the nature and extent of the surety's 
liability. Id. Since Appellants executed their bond pursuant to the provisions for a renters' 
counter-bond in the Unlawful Detainer statute, the scope of Appellants' undertaking must be 
read in conjunction with the careful legislative balance embodied in the Unlawful Detainer 
provisions. As discussed in Appellants' Opening Brief, (Appellants' Opening Br. at 26) to 
construe Appellants' bond to waive the requirement for a separate action on the bond would 
overturn that balance. Nothing in the Unlawful Detainer statute nor in the Appellants' bond 
provides for enforcement of the bond in the Unlawful Detainer proceeding. Compare Dennis 
Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC, Inc. v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 560-61 (Utah 1983)(bond 
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exceeded the statutory requirements by expressly agreeing to pay $20,000 per claim, rather 
than $20,000 in the aggregate for all claims). 
Appellees further contend that the provisions in the Unlawful Detainer statute that a 
possession bond should be made "payable to the clerk of the court" and that an Unlawful 
Detainer judgment "may be issued and enforced immediately," dispense with the requirement 
for an independent enforcement action on the bond. (Br. of Appellees at 17-18). These 
contentions are addressed in Appellants' Opening Brief. (Appellants1 Opening Br. at 24-27) 
Moreover, Appellees seem to urge a "hostage" theory of surety, by contending that "payable" 
means "paid," that the "clerk of the court" means "the landlord," and that immediate 
enforcement may be had against the surety-gwa-hostage, rather than against the tenant. 
Appellees cannot by such artful interpretation convert an action against the tenant into an 
action against the surety. That is contrary to the Utah common law requirement that an 
independent action must be brought to enforce a bond, and also against the careful balance 
of landlord-tenant rights and obligations embodied in the Unlawful Detainer statute. 
Appellees also argue that the court in Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) concluded that a possession bond constitutes a general appearance for 
purposes of enforcement of the bond. In the first place, that case involved Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure Rule 64C, regarding attachment bonds, not renter's possession bonds. Second, 
Rule 64C(g) expressly provides for enforcement by motion and also expressly requires 
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attachment bonds to provide that the surety "submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court," 
neither of which are contained in the Unlawful Detainer statute with respect to possession 
bonds. Third, the surety in Fitzgerald had made a general appearance in a show cause 
hearing, contrary to the Appellees' argument herein that the mere filing of the bond 
constituted a general appearance. Neither Mr. Kasteler nor Ms. Daines, the sureties herein, 
made any appearances whatsoever in the landlord's Unlawful Detainer proceeding. Fourth, 
the Fitzgerald case did not involve the delicate balancing of the policies underlying landlord-
tenant law as are involved here. 
In what appears to be a modern version of the "hostage theory" of sureties, Appellees 
essentially urge that a tenant's possession bond should be interpreted as a confession of 
judgment by the sureties. Such "cognovit notes" were an early form of common law security 
which are now greatly disfavored in the law. Utah Nat. Bank v. Sears, 13 Utah 172, 172-73, 
44 P. 832, 832-33 (Utah 1896). Confessions of judgment therefore must be expressly 
authorized by statute, and specific procedures for their enforcement must be followed. UTAH 
CODE ANN.§ 78-22-3 (judgment by confession authorized); UTAH R.CIV.P. 
58A(f)(procedures for enforcement of judgment by confession). No statute nor rule of 
procedure authorizes a confession of judgment by a surety on a possession bond. 
Accordingly, Appellees cannot successfully argue that the possession bond provisions of the 
Unlawful Detainer statute should be construed to achieve the same result. 
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POINT II 
THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION DID NOT "AFFECT TITLE" 
TO THE SURETIES' HOMES 
The possession bond in this case provided that Appellants undertook the tenants' 
obligation to pay costs of suit and actual damages up to $25,000 if the tenant was found to 
be in unlawful detainer, and the Appellants further pledged their homes, in which they had 
a total equity of $359,000, as additional security. (Appellants' Opening Br., Exh. 1, at 1-2) 
Appellees argue that the bond "unquestionably created a situation where title to 
[Appellants'] houses 'would be affected'... because the outcome of the Unlawful Detainer 
Action would have completely and irrefutably dictated the result of the enforcement action." 
(Br. of Appellees at 21) Appellees thereby confuse the liability of the tenant for the debt 
involved, with the liability of the sureties for such debt, as well as the extent to which the 
sureties' homes could be subjected to enforcement for such debt. The Unlawful Detainer 
proceeding adjudicated the liability of the tenant for damages and costs in the event of 
unlawful detainer (this is the "debt" involved), but such adjudication could not determine the 
liability of the sureties, nor of the sureties' homes, because the sureties by statute could not 
be parties to the suit between the landlord and tenant. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-
8.5(2)(b)("property bond...executed by two persons...who are not parties to the action.") If 
the mere filing of a possession bond transformed sureties into parties, as Appellees contend, 
that would deter people from assisting tenants through the filing of such bonds, thereby 
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overturning the careful legislative balance between the rights of landlords and tenants 
embodied in the Unlawful Detainer statute. It is one thing to file a bond; it is quite another 
to agree to join a lawsuit as a defendant, with the attendant attorneys fees and other costs 
such participation entails. Appellees would eliminate that distinction, which serves an 
invaluable purpose in landlord-tenant law by encouraging assistance for tenants. 
More broadly, when the Legislature has decided to dispense with the requirement that 
an independent enforcement action on a bond must be brought, it has done so in no uncertain 
terms. Thus, all of the following contain identical language: "The surety's liability may be 
enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action." See UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 31A-35-704(bailbond)(emphasis added); 77-20-5 (bail bond)(emphasis added); 78-38-14 
(crack-house abatement bond)(emphasis added); see also Rule 7, Utah Rules App. Proc. 
(appeal bond); Rule 65A(c)(3), Utah Rules Civ. Proc. (injunction bond); Rule 64C(g), Utah 
Rules Civ. Proc. (writ of attachment bond); Rule 64B(e), Utah Rules Civ. Proc. (defendant's 
counter-bond in replevin action for personalty); Rule 62(i)(4), Utah Rules Civ. Proc. 
(supersedeas bond). The legislature has not changed the common law requirement in the 
landlord-tenant setting herein. 
The Unlawful Detainer proceeding did not entail such questions as: (1) If the tenant 
did not pay its debt to the landlord, have the sureties personally paid up to the $25,000 of the 
tenant's debt to the landlord which the sureties agreed to pay? (2) And if neither the tenant 
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nor the sureties paid the debt, may the landlord proceed to enforce the debt against the 
sureties' homes as set out in the possession bond? Such questions would have been 
adjudicated in a separate and independent enforcement action against the sureties on their 
bond, as required by Utah common law. Junction Irrigation Co. v. Snow, 101 Utah 71, 118 
P.2d 130 (1941)(injunction bond); see also Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. 
v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984)(citing Junction case as 
general rule); Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977)(confirming that Junction 
case states mle in Utah). Although it might make it easier for landlords to obtain recovery 
from the tenants, their sureties, and the sureties' homes if landlords could proceed to enforce 
possession bonds in Unlawful Detainer proceedings, the Legislature has not so provided. 
Appellees additionally argue that the cases of Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 
(Utah 1996) and Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) support their 
contention that the Unlawful Detainer proceeding "affected" title or possession of Appellants' 
homes. (Br. of Appellees at 22-26) Appellees misinterpret both cases, as set out in 
Appellants' Opening Brief. {See Appellants' Opening Br. at 19-20) 
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POINT III 
APPELLEES' CONDUCT WAS NOT PROTECTED BY THE 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS PRIVILEGE 
Appellees urge that a lis pendens is a "statement" in the "course of a judicial 
proceeding" under the judicial proceedings privilege. (Br. of Appellees at 26-28). The filing 
of the lis pendens herein were not mere "statements," however, but liens and encumbrances 
undertaken as enforcement actions by the landlord. (See Appellants' Opening Br. at 14-17) 
Appellees argue erroneously that the possession bond, not the lis pendens, created the liens 
and encumbrances. (Br. of Appellees at 25-26, 34) As discussed above, such an 
interpretation of the effect of a surety's filing of a possession bond on behalf of a tenant is 
indefensible in law or policy. Accordingly, the lis pendens were not "statements" within the 
judicial proceedings privilege, but actually created liens and encumbrances against 
Appellants' homes-which is precisely why Appellees filed them. Moreover, there was no 
"judicial proceeding" pending against either the sureties (Appellants) or against the sureties' 
homes at the time that the lis pendens were recorded against Appellants' homes. (Appellants' 
Opening Br. at 29-30) Therefore, the judicial proceedings privilege did not apply. 
As a second line of defense, Appellees argue that even if the lis pendens themselves 
created liens and encumbrances against Appellants' homes, this Court in Hansen v. Kohler, 
550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976) approved of such conduct. However, unlike the case herein, the 
lis pendens in Hansen was supported by a pending action directly affecting title to the land 
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subject to the lis pendens. See Hansen, supra (action for declaration that deeds transferring 
"Howell property" were intended as security instruments; lis pendens recorded on "Howell 
property"). In addition, also unlike the case herein, Hansen was not a landlord-tenant case. 
Thus, the Hansen court had no reason to consider the profound effect on title that lis pendens 
entail. (See Appellants1 Opening Br. at 14-17) In the present litigation, the landlord recorded 
the lis pendens precisely because they did more than merely impart notice; the landlord used 
them as self-help weapons to force the tenant to move and to pay quickly. It would 
contravene the purposes of landlord-tenant law to allow landlords to so easily oppress 
tenants. 
Appellees also argue that to refuse to extend the judicial proceedings privilege to the 
present circumstances would render the doctrine "meaningless." (Br. of Appellees at 28) 
First, the suggestion that the common law judicial proceedings privilege "trumps" the 
Wrongful Lien statute is novel to the law. The Legislature clearly can modify a common law 
doctrine. See generally Neeslev v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 Utah 259, 261, 99 P. 1067, 1069 
(1909)(statute abrogated common law doctrine of fellow servants). 
Second, the present case involves the limited area of landlord-tenant law, and 
specifically, the circumstances under which a landlord can deploy the lis pendens weapon 
against a voluntary surety of the tenant. Appellees1 concerns for the utility of the judicial 
proceedings privilege are not well-founded. 
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Third, the Texas case cited by Appellees for their position, Prappas v. Meverland 
Cmtv. Improvement Ass'n, 795 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), is distinguishable: (1) In 
Prappas, a homeowners Association brought a declaratory judgment action against some 
homeowners to determine whether the proposed sale of the homes violated deed restrictions. 
The Association lost the suit at trial (and ultimately on appeal), but after the trial court 
judgment and about one week before the sales were to take place, the Association filed lis 
pendens against the homeowners who were trying to sell their homes, causing the sales to 
fall through. The lis pendens in Prappas, however, were filed in conjunction with a 
declaratory judgment action "affecting title" to the homes, so they would have been proper 
under Utah law as well. In contrast, no action affecting title to Appellants' homes justifies 
the lis pendens filed by Appellees herein. (2) Also, in Prappas, the court pointed out that the 
homeowners should have asked the trial court to remove the lis pendens, an argument that 
Appellees also make herein. (Br. of Appellees at 32) However, that would have been possible 
in Prappas only because the homeowners were already parties to the declaratory judgment 
litigation itself, unlike the present case, in which the sureties were statutorily prohibited from 
being parties to the unlawful detainer action brought by Appellees against a commercial 
tenant UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b)("property bond...executed by two persons...who 
are not parties to the action."). Moreover, as discussed above, tenants' sureties would be 
deterred from assisting tenants if filing of a possession bond automatically made the sureties 
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parties to the landlord's suit. 
Fourth, Appellees cite an unpublished federal court decision, Fitzgerald v. Utah 
County, 931 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1991) construing Utah law. Not only is such citation 
prohibited by Rule 4-508 of the UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, but that opinion 
completely disregards the pivotal fact that in Hansen, there was a suit pending affecting title 
to the realty upon which the lis pendens was recorded. Utah law is for this Court to decide. 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, Rule 4-508(l)("Unpublished opinions... have 
no precedential value and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for 
purposes of applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel") 
POINT IV 
LIS PENDENS THAT DO NOT COMPLY WITH THE LIS PENDENS 
STATUTE ARE WRONGFUL LIENS 
Appellees make the rather startling argument that even if they did not comply with the 
terms of the lis pendens statute because there was no action pending "affecting title or 
possession" to Appellants' homes when Appellees filed lis pendens on such homes, Appellees 
nevertheless are not liable for Wrongful Liens because "persons who purport to file in 
accordance with the lis pendens statute, even if they run afoul of the terms of that statute," 
are exempted by the Wrongful Lien statute. (Br. of Appellees at 35). The Wrongful Lien 
statute, however, exempts only lis pendens filed "in accordance" with Utah Code Ann. § 78-
40-2, the lis pendens statute. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2(2) Appellees' construction would 
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allow any person to file a lis pendens against any realty at any time, so long as such person 
maintained they were "purporting" to act under the lis pendens statute. If so, we all should 
avoid offending anyone who might thus cloud title to our homes. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellees' remaining arguments with respect to whether Appellants properly stated 
claims for relief for purposes of a Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion are 
addressed in our Opening Brief. (Appellants' Opening Br. at 30-35) This Court should 
reverse the trial court's dismissal of Appellants' complaint and Appellees should be taxed 
with costs on appeal. 
DATED this $ day of December 2000. 
JJ&>*&t^ 
^ J Q H N MARTINE 
C/Attorney for Appellants 
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